Address climate change

Address climate change without compromising living standards or growth

Americans do not need to understand the science of climate change to accept its reality.

It is evident in our daily lives as we witness the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, flooding, wildfires, and rising insurance premiums.

The fact that the current administration denies it does not make it so. For a detailed review, see our research at OurFutureAmerica.org.

We expect that after the Trump Administration, the discussion will shift from “is it true” to “what should be done.” At that point, we will be able to focus on the legitimate questions about the cost-benefit analysis of any proposed policy. The fact that a sizable part of the population sides with the Trump Administration may reflect something other than scientific denial: they do not believe that prior administrations have been balanced and practical in their approach. Our conclusion, therefore, is that every effort must be made to address climate change without raising consumer energy costs materially or suppressing growth.

Our confidence that this can be done is not theoretical. Other countries have done it.

China has built the world’s largest solar and wind capacity while sustaining rapid industrial expansion. France decarbonized most of its electricity sector decades ago through nuclear power, achieving low emissions, stable prices, and energy security without sacrificing living standards. Norway has paired decades of hydroelectric development with one of the highest per-capita incomes in the world, while Iceland built a modern, energy-intensive economy on geothermal and hydro power.

The consistent takeaway is that technology deployment, scale, and reliable baseload power—not consumption limits—are what decouple emissions from prosperity.

The binding constraint is building capacity

The obstacles to building clean energy infrastructure are the same ones suppressing growth in housing, healthcare, and food—permitting delays, regulatory fragmentation, and litigation-driven inertia.

The U.S. does not lack climate targets or private capital. It lacks the institutional capacity to convert either into physical infrastructure. Transmission lines, clean generation, and grid upgrades routinely take a decade or more to reach construction, even when projects reduce net environmental harm. Overlapping federal reviews, fragmented state authority, and litigation-driven delay have become structural barriers to emissions reduction.

Interstate transmission illustrates the problem. Projects must navigate sequential federal reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act and Clean Water Act. State siting regimes effectively grant veto power over nationally significant infrastructure. Department of Energy analysis shows that without large-scale transmission expansion, the U.S. cannot meet reliability needs and emissions targets simultaneously. Yet transmission remains among the hardest infrastructure categories to permit. Even after approvals, projects often languish for years in interconnection queues due to outdated planning rules and unresolved cost-allocation disputes. The cumulative effect is a de facto moratorium on clean energy deployment.

Generation constraints compound the problem. Wind and solar must continue to expand, but experience in low-emissions economies shows that intermittent resources alone cannot support a reliable, affordable grid. France’s nuclear fleet, Norway’s hydroelectric system, and Iceland’s geothermal infrastructure demonstrate that firm, dispatchable clean power is essential to deep decarbonization without sacrificing living standards. In the U.S., advanced nuclear and geothermal projects exist but are slowed by licensing frameworks built for a different era.

What needs to change

If climate policy is to deliver results without undermining growth, it must focus on a narrow set of reforms that remove bottlenecks and accelerate construction. Many of these changes are already acknowledged in policy debates but not yet carried far enough to resolve the binding constraints.

Permitting reform is the most immediate priority. Bipartisan proposals such as the Energy Permitting Reform Act of 2024 reflect growing recognition that the current system is incompatible with large-scale infrastructure deployment. Independent policy organizations have reached similar conclusions, emphasizing that faster permitting and meaningful environmental review are not in conflict.

The direction is clear: Impose statutory deadlines for environmental reviews, consolidate duplicative federal processes under a single lead agency, make federal backstop siting authority for interstate transmission operational when states fail to act, and limit serial litigation that delays construction without improving outcomes.

Federal agencies have begun to move in this direction. The Department of Energy has finalized rules establishing a coordinated two-year federal authorization schedule for certain transmission projects, explicitly targeting overlapping reviews. That timeline should be treated as a baseline, not an exception. Expedited review should be expanded for low-impact grid upgrades, and agencies must be staffed and held accountable for meeting deadlines.

Grid interconnection reform is necessary but incomplete. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Order No. 2023 modernizes interconnection procedures through cluster studies, standardized timelines, and clearer cost allocation. These reforms must be fully implemented and paired with regional transmission planning that anticipates future electrification demand rather than relying on historical load. Without that alignment, clean generation will continue to be stranded regardless of investment incentives.

Firm clean power requires similar modernization. Congress has directed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to update licensing for advanced reactors while maintaining safety. Those reforms should move faster and go further: Decouple reactor design approval from site approval, align licensing timelines with construction and financing realities, and support first-of-a-kind projects with long-term federal power purchase agreements. Parallel support for enhanced geothermal demonstration projects would further diversify firm clean power options.

Market incentives should reinforce these reforms. Technology-neutral clean electricity tax credits have reduced investment risk, but permitting delays often prevent projects from qualifying before deadlines. Stabilizing and extending credits where necessary, expanding incentives for long-duration storage and geothermal systems, and pairing tax policy with demand-side market creation would accelerate scale without mandating technologies. Federal Buy Clean procurement programs already demonstrate how public purchasing can create early markets for low-carbon materials. Expanding these efforts would speed industrial decarbonization while preserving flexibility.

Managing risk while cutting emissions

Climate policy must also address risks that are already here. Flooding, wildfire, and extreme heat are destabilizing insurance markets and increasing public disaster spending. Managing these risks is necessary to protect economic stability during the transition.

Federal flood policy is misaligned with current risk. The National Flood Insurance Program continues to underprice exposure in high-risk areas, encouraging development patterns that increase long-term losses. Congress has repeatedly blocked full implementation of risk-based pricing, a decision that socializes private risk at public expense. Risk-based pricing should be paired with targeted mitigation funding for elevation, flood barriers, and voluntary buyouts, while flood-control investments should be based on climate-adjusted risk rather than historical data.

Wildfire policy should focus on prevention over response. Expanding categorical exclusions for fuel-reduction projects, increasing prescribed burning and mechanical thinning on federal lands, and tying wildfire funding to measurable risk-reduction outcomes would lower suppression costs and reduce insurance losses.

Extreme heat is a growing economic risk, particularly in urban areas. Updating building codes to encourage passive cooling design and supporting grid-resilient cooling centers would reduce mortality, productivity losses, and peak electricity demand while easing stress on the power system.

Conclusion

Climate change can be addressed without shrinking the economy, but only if policy focuses on execution rather than aspiration. Targets and incentives are not enough when infrastructure cannot be built. The decisive factors are permitting reform, grid expansion, firm clean power deployment, aligned market incentives, and disciplined risk management. Countries that have reduced emissions while maintaining prosperity did so by building at scale. The U.S. has done it before. The question is whether we still have the institutional capacity to do it again.

Sources

1. U.S. Department of Energy, National Transmission Needs Study — energy.gov/oe/national-transmission-needs-study

2. IEA, Electricity Information — iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-product/electricity-information

3. U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Energy Permitting Reform Act of 2024 — energy.senate.gov/2024/7/manchin-barrasso-release-bipartisan-energy-permitting-reform-legislation

4. Bipartisan Policy Center, The Energy Permitting Reform Act of 2024: What’s in the Bill — bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/the-energy-permitting-reform-act-of-2024-whats-in-the-bill

5. Federal Register, Coordination of Federal Authorizations for Electric Transmission Facilities (CITAP Final Rule) — federalregister.gov/documents/2024/05/01/2024-08157/coordination-of-federal-authorizations-for-electric-transmission-facilities

6. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Final Rules for Technology-Neutral Clean Electricity Credits — home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2774